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Timothy J. Bartik and Kevin M. Hollenbeck

Employment Effects of
the Washington High
Technology Business and
Occupation Tax Credit
This article summarizes findings from Upjohn
Institute Working Paper No. 12-187. Visit www
.upjohn.org to read the paper.

W

ashington State has a High
Technology Business and Occupation
Tax Credit that allows a credit against the
state’s gross receipts tax for firms that
exceed a certain threshold of qualified
research and development (R&D)
spending. A major purpose of this credit
is to stimulate employment growth. In
spring 2012, the Joint Legislative Audit
and Review Committee of the state
legislature contracted with the Upjohn
Institute to conduct a study that would
estimate the extent to which the High
Tech Tax Credit does, in fact, stimulate
employment growth.
To address this question, we used tax
return data from firms that claimed a tax
credit on their business and occupation
tax returns between 2004 and 2009. Companies that claim the credit must also file
the state’s Annual Tax Incentive Survey,
and we used that survey data as well.
Self-Reported Employment Creation
One question on the Tax Incentive
Survey asks firms to report “the amount
of credit claimed for the calendar year,”
and another question asks “how many

new employment positions did your firm
create in Washington State during the
calendar year?” Table 1 summarizes these
survey data by year.
Interpreted naively, these data might
seem to indicate that the credit is very
cost-effective in creating jobs. If one
assumes that all the employment created
in these firms was due to the credit, then
the credit cost per job created is low,
averaging less than $2,000 annually per
job-year (for example, the total credit
cost over all years of about $123 million
divided by about 74,000 jobs yields a
cost per job-year of $1,662).
Models
Table 1 does not reveal, however,
whether the tax credit created the
reported employment. Does causality run
from the credit to employment growth
or from growth to more credits claimed?
Firms that are expanding may choose to
spend some of their additional revenue on
R&D, thereby increasing credits claimed.
Alternatively, the tax credit may incent
firms to invest in R&D, which increases
employment. Without further evidence,
we cannot determine the direction of
causation.
Unraveling the direction of causality is
the key to estimating the effect of the tax
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Table 1 Self-Reported Employment Creation and Tax Credit, by Year
Average
Total
employment
employment
Average
Total credits taken
Year
created
created
credit ($)
($, millions)
2004
5.39
3,223
39,611
23.687
2005
31.07
16,622
31,003
16.587
2006
27.49
13,937
34,229
17.354
2007
27.05
14,309
37,499
19.837
2008
33.17
16,885
43,599
22.192
2009
18.25
9,305
46,696
23.815
All years
23.30
74,281
38,730
123.472
SOURCE: Washington Tax Incentive Survey.
credit on employment. In this study we
identified causation through instrumental
variables, which cause shifts in R&D
credits for the firms that are unrelated to
the firm’s own decisions.
Our model assumes that a firm’s hiring
decisions are based on its profits. Profits
are negatively related to costs, so hiring
is negatively related to a firm’s costs. The
high tech tax credit influences a firm’s
decision making by reducing the cost of
R&D. We assume that the effect of the
R&D subsidy on business location and
expansion decisions is proportional to
this subsidy’s effects on business costs.
The outcomes that we have analyzed
include employment and overall wages
paid at the firm. We examined how
changes in the credit subsidy affect the
firm’s growth in employment or wages,
and we estimated our model using firms’
average credit ratios and marginal credit
ratios. The latter is the additional tax
credit that would be earned by spending
one additional dollar on R&D. For many
firms, these two ratios are the same—
equal to the credit subsidy rate for that
industry and year. However, because the
credit is nonrefundable, the marginal
credit ratio drops to 0 if the amount of
the credit for which the firm is eligible
exceeds its tax liability, or if the firm’s
computed tax credit exceeds $2 million.
Hypotheses
We structure our empirical model
around how the R&D credit lowers a
business’s costs. The research literature
on state and local business taxes suggests
that the long-run effects of a 10 percent
increase in all state and local business

2

taxes is to reduce a location’s business
activity by between 1 and 6 percent
(Bartik 1991). Because state and local
business taxes have usually averaged
around 5 percent of business costs in the
United States, this implies that a onehalf of a 1 percent increase in business
costs (a 10 percent increase in business
taxes when business taxes are 5 percent
of overall costs) will reduce business
activity by between 1 and 6 percent, and
therefore a 1 percent increase in business
costs will reduce business activity by
between 2 and 12 percent. Our model is
structured so that the R&D credit variable
is scaled by its effects on business costs,
so we would expect the credit variable to
have a coefficient of between −2 and −12.
Scaling the credit by effects on business
costs means that the credit price is scaled
by the firm’s R&D spending as a share of
total costs, which is what economists call
R&D’s “factor share.”
We tried three different instrumental
variables for the R&D factor share:
1) the average R&D factor share in
Washington in an industry where the
average was calculated by omitting the
firm; 2) the national R&D factor share
for the industry using data from the
National Science Foundation; and 3) the
firm’s projected factor share in a year, in
which the projection was accomplished
by applying the national rate of R&D
expenditure growth in the industry (from
the National Science Foundation [NSF]
data) to the firm’s factor share in the first
year of data.1 All of these instrumental
variables are designed to predict a
firm’s R&D spending and credit but be
independent of the firm’s own changing
decisions. The third instrument has the

most variability because it incorporates
the most firm-specific information, which
should increase prediction in estimation.
In theory, average credit rates would
be germane to a major location decision.
If decision makers at a firm are trying to
decide whether to locate in Washington,
then they might compare the net tax
rates from several jurisdictions as part
of their decision-making process, and
in Washington that would include the
average credit rate. However, if they are
making decisions at the margin, such as
expanding R&D or employment, then
they are going to respond to the marginal
tax and credit rates.
Table 2 shows the estimation results
for models in which employment growth
and earnings growth are explained
by changes in R&D costs, using the
marginal credit ratio, for the three sets
of instrumental variables. Our preferred
specification is using the instrumental
variable that is presented in the third
column, that is, using a baseline R&D
factor share and inflating it annually
at the rate of growth of R&D in the
industry, as these estimates are the most
precise.
To estimate the job growth that
resulted from the tax credit, we used the
firms’ data and the parameters from our
preferred estimated model with the actual
marginal credit ratio and with a marginal
credit rate of 0 to predict employment
growth with and without the credit.2 We
did a similar calculation for total wages at
the firm. Table 3 presents these results.
As seen in the table, the number of
jobs created by the tax credit annually
ranged between about 380 and about
510, which represented a growth in
jobs at these firms of between 0.53 and
0.62 percent. The amount of earnings
generated in the state from these jobs
ranges from about $14.2 million to
$23.0 million. The levels of earnings
represented a growth in earnings of
between 0.20 and 0.25 percent.3 We
calculate the average cost per job created
by dividing the entries in the last column
of Table 3 by the jobs created in the
second column. These averages range
from $40,409 (2006) to $50,291 (2009).
The job creation numbers reported
in Table 3 are job-years created—they
should not be interpreted as additional
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Table 2 Effects of Changes in R&D Credit Subsidies on an Individual Firm’s Growth
Instrumental variable
Industry
National
Baseline factor
average
R&D factor share share growing at
Dependent variable/model
(without firm)
growth rate
national rate
Employment/growth
−10.44
−2.02
−4.94***
(8.06)
(6.32)
(1.92)
Earnings/growth
−13.14
−2.64
−2.90
(10.68)
(8.21)
(2.42)
NOTE: Entries are estimated effects of a credit subsidy on firm growth, scaled so that it shows the
percentage effects on firm growth of an increase in the credit subsidy received of 1 percent of
the firm’s overall business costs. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
***statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

permanent jobs created each year. Our
model estimates that a change in the
tax credit causes a once-and-for-all
permanent change in the number of jobs
in the state. Therefore, the job-years
listed in the second column should not
be summed to get a cumulative total of
jobs created. In other words, our model
estimates that if policymakers had
eliminated the tax credit in 2009, the
level of jobs in these firms would have
been permanently lower by 484 jobs.
Furthermore, only about 40 percent
of the employment creation in this
study occurred in industries that would
be expected to be “export-based”
industries, that is, to primarily sell
goods and services outside the state of
Washington. For non-export-based firms,
any expansion of the firms receiving
the tax credit would likely reduce sales
of other firms in that same industry in
Washington, as they are competing for

the same Washington customers, with
little net effects on state employment. If
there is a multiplier of 2.0 for the exportbased firms, and 0.0 for the non-exportbased firms, the net employment creation
would be approximately 80 percent as
large as the numbers in Table 3.
Conclusion
Our analyses of tax credit data suggest
that the Washington high tech R&D
tax credit does increase employment
to a very modest extent. The analyses
suggest that, because of the tax credit,
employment grew by between 0.5 and 0.6
percent at the firms that claimed credits.
Our preferred specification suggests that
firms respond to the marginal credit rate,
which we should note is zero for slightly
less than one-quarter of the sample.
The cost per job created implied by
these estimates is relatively high. The

Table 3 Estimated Employment and Earnings Creation, by Year
Total credit taken
Year
Employment
Earnings ($, millions)
($, millions)
2005
378
14.244
18.541
(84, 672)
(−9.528, 38.016)
2006
430
18.988
17.376
(96, 764)
(−12.702, 50.678)
2007
469
21.114
19.487
(117, 833)
(−14.125, 56.353)
2008
511
23.019
22.672
(114, 907)
(−15.399, 61.437)
2009
484
20.728
24.341
(108, 860)
(−13.866, 55.322)
NOTE: Table entries in the second and third columns are estimated jobs and earnings created as a
result of the R&D tax credit. The entries in parentheses are the lower and upper bounds of a 95
percent confidence interval. The “credit taken” data are derived from tax return data, and hence
differ slightly from the survey data reported in Table 1.

range in the above estimates is from just
over $40,000 to just over $50,000 per
job created. Although the jobs created
may pay more than those figures, not all
earnings generated are a pure benefit. We
know from previous studies that only a
portion of newly created jobs actually
result in increased local employment
rates and earnings per capita. Up to fourfifths of all new jobs in a state will end
up being reflected in higher population
rather than higher state employment rates.
That is, a 1 percent increase in a state’s
employment is estimated to lead after 5
or more years to a 0.8 percent increase in
state population, with a resulting increase
of 0.2 percent in the state’s employment
to population ratio (Bartik 1991, 1993).
Some of the new jobs will also help state
residents advance to better-paying jobs
than would have occurred otherwise, as
the new jobs make it easier for them to
be hired in better-paying occupations.
Estimates suggest that a 1 percent
increase in a state’s employment leads
to a 0.2 percent increase in earnings per
capita due to state residents moving up to
better-paying occupations (Bartik 1991).
Combining these two effects, a 1
percent increase in jobs, which would
directly increase state earnings by 1
percent if the jobs pay similarly to the
average state job, will actually lead to a
somewhat lower 0.4 percent increase in
state earnings per capita: 0.2 percent due
to higher state employment rates, and 0.2
percent due to state residents moving up
to better-paying occupations. The boost
in state earnings of 0.4 percent is 40
percent of the 1 percent extra earnings
directly associated with the new jobs.
Therefore, in evaluating the benefits for
state residents from new jobs, only about
40 percent of the earnings from the new
jobs lead to higher earnings per capita for
state residents.
Why is the cost per job created in
this study relatively high? Four reasons
seem most important. First, this study
finds that, consistent with the research
literature, state and local business activity
is only modestly responsive to lower
costs. Second, for the firms receiving this
particular tax credit, the ratio of earnings
and output to employment is relatively
high, which implies that a given dollar
tax credit has more modest percentage
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effects in lowering overall business costs.
Third, a significant proportion of the tax
credits are capped, which means that
on the margin these tax credits do not
lower the costs of expanding Washington
employment. Fourth, a significant
proportion of the tax credits are awarded
to non-export-based firms, which will
have lower effects on overall Washington
employment.
These explanations point to ways
to lower the cost per job created from
this policy. In particular, targeting
export-based firms with high multiplier
effects, and making sure that incentives
affect marginal costs to firms that are
expanding, will help reduce the cost per
job created. Higher multiplier effects
will be more likely if firms have stronger
local supplier links. Finally, if the goal is
job creation, directly tying the magnitude
of the incentive to job creation provides a
greater reason for firms to respond to the
incentive with job creation.
Notes
1. Dr. Raymond Wolfe of the NSF
graciously assisted us in navigating the NSF
data, and released the 2008 and 2009 data
slightly early.
2. Note that many firms’ marginal credit
ratio is 0, so that no simulated job creation
occurs at these firms.
3. The fact that wages increased less than
employment suggests that the credit had a
negative impact on wages per employee. This
finding is not surprising because one would
assume that new hires make, on average,
less than incumbent workers. In addition,
lower-wage firms may have higher percentage
effects of the tax credit on costs.
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Françoise Carré and Chris Tilly

Part-Time and Short Hours
in Retail in the United
States, Canada, and Mexico
How Institutions Matter

I

n sectors where full-time schedules
do not dominate, total hours matter
greatly for job quality. We explore hour
levels and trends in retail trade, which is
known for part-time work. We compare
the United States, Canada, and Mexico,
taking advantage of the fact that work
hours regulations vary cross-nationally.
By comparing retail hour levels and
trends, we contribute insights into policy
and regulatory impacts on job quality.
Our analysis draws mainly on publicly
available data from national statistical
offices in the three countries; from 419

U.S. retail relies heavily on parttime workers, who increasingly
are guaranteed very few weekly
hours, but are expected to “flex
up” to 40 hours on demand.
field interviews with retail executives,
managers, and workers in the United
States and Mexico; and from secondary
sources.
Retail Hours—Cause for
Policy Concern
The issue of insufficient hours is
ubiquitous in U.S. retail. Schedules
are driven by retailers’ extension of
opening hours, and by wide swings in
shopping flows throughout the day and
week, as well as seasonally. Retail in the
United States relies heavily on part-time
workers, who increasingly are guaranteed
very few weekly hours, but are expected
to “flex up” to 40 hours on demand.
Moreover, today even the full-time-hours
guarantee falls below 40 hours, and often
below 35.

These patterns have significant
implications for the workforce. Lower
standard hours reduce the base level of
weekly earnings that workers—full- and
part-time—can rely upon. Additionally,
retailers’ scheduling practices generate
variability and unpredictability in
individuals’ total hours and in the
distribution of these hours. Part-timers
receive few or no benefits and usually
a lower hourly wage than full-time
workers. For these reasons, retail
work hours and the firm strategies and
institutional factors that drive them
warrant attention.
In each of the countries we examined,
long and expanding hours of operation
create two managerial goals: 1) control
labor costs with lean staffing, and 2)
closely match staffing levels to customer
flow. However, in the United States and
Canada, these twin goals lead retailers to
shorten employee work hours and expand
part-time jobs, whereas in Mexico they
lead retailers to lengthen hours.
The three countries provide a useful
comparison. They are neighbors and
share many of the same retail chains—
Wal-Mart is the largest retailer in both
the United States and Mexico and is one
of the top retailers in Canada as well. Yet
the labor market and social protection
institutions of the three countries are
quite distinct, with important implications
for hours of work.
Contrasting Hours in Canada,
the United States, and Mexico
We find differing levels and trends in
retail hours across the three countries in
recent decades. Table 1 provides average
weekly hours levels; data are broadly
comparable multiyear averages (see

